Human Factors Analysis of Naval Transport Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Line Related Incidents by Schmidt, John K. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
1999
Human Factors Analysis of Naval Transport
Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Line Related Incidents
Schmidt, John K.; Figlock, Robert C.; Teeters, Curtis D.
SAE International
Schmidt, John K., Robert C. Figlock, and Curtis D. Teeters. "Human factors analysis
of naval transport aircraft maintenance and flight line related incidents." SAE
transactions (1999): 709-713.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64834
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
 1999-01-2981
 Human Factors Analysis of Naval Transport Aircraft
 Maintenance and Flight Line Related Incidents
 John K. Schmidt, USN, Robert C. Figlock, USMC
 and Curtis D. Teeters, USN
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Copyright© 1999 Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
 ABSTRACT
 To study maintainer error, the Naval Safety Center's
 Human Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS)
 was adapted for Maintenance Related Mishaps (MRMs).
 The HFACS Maintenance Extension (ME) successfully
 profiled the errors present Naval Aviation Class A MRMs.
 In order to assess Its suitability for studying major and
 minor airline accidents, a post hoc analysis was con-
 ducted on 124 Naval Fleet Logistics Support (VR) Wing
 maintenance related mishap, hazard, and injury reports.
 Two judges separately coded the 124 VR Wing incidents;
 a Cohen's kappa of .78 was achieved, indicating an
 "excellent" level of agreement. Generally, HFACS-ME
 was able to profile maintainer errors found in more minor
 incidents and the factors that contribute to them. Com-
 mon factors observed include errors attributed to third
 party maintenance, inadequate supervision, failed com-
 munications, skill-based errors, and procedural viola-
 tions.
 INTRODUCTION
 Marx (1998) in a comprehensive review of maintenance
 error investigation and analysis systems states that
 human error is "under-served" by traditional event investi-
 gation methods. He contends that they effectively end
 with the identification of a human error without an effort to
 determine why it occurred. Many have previously
 observed this same problem and attributed it to several
 factors: 1) reporting criteria, 2) investigator biases, 3)
 report scope, depth, and quality, 4) reporting system
 design, and 5) database construction (Adams & Hartwell,
 1977; Boyle, 1980; Edwards, 1981; Benner, 1982; Pimble
 & O'Toole, 1982; Andersson & Lagerloff, 1983). Marx
 (1998) reflects many argue that through human factors
 oriented investigation and reporting process "industry
 can now begin to understand why people make certain
 mistakes."
 Harle (1994) posits that "accident prevention is critically
 linked to the adequacy of the investigation of human fac-
 tors." However, the same issues can plague such sys-
 tems as traditional systems if not properly designed,
 implemented, and supported. Zotov (1996) in reflecting
 on the standard International Civil Aviation Organization
 (ICAO) reports involving human factors states that they
 "frequently generated more heat than light." Further,
 Bruggin (1996) finds the reactive use of human factors
 accident data fails to "exploit the preventive potential of
 the human element that safeguards the system."
 Even though there is a general agreement in the aviation
 industry that human factors based investigation methods
 are better, they are not being widely used. Marx (1998)
 cited that of 92 carriers trained to use the Maintenance
 Error Decision Aid (MEDA), only six were in the United
 States. He notes that this was in spite of the fact that 15
 percent of air carrier mishaps are attributed to mainte-
 nance error at an annual cost of over a billion dollars.
 Some of the reasons cited were their tendency to place
 blame, not transcend the proximate causes, emphasize
 static who, what, and when variables and not dig for
 underlying causes.
 A conceptual framework of human error that had gained
 fairly wide acceptance across the government, military,
 and commercial sector is that established by Reason's
 model (1980; 1997). It showed unsafe individual acts
 were not the only accident generating agent, and that
 organization processes and task/environment conditions
 "set the stage" for their occurrence (see Figure 1 ). Marx
 (1998) lamented that despite this acceptance, the model
 does not provide for the identification of precursors to
 accidents.
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 HUMAN FACTORS ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
 SYSTEM - MAINTENANCE EXTENSION
 The Human Factors Accident Classification System
 (HFACS) was developed by the Naval Safety Center to
 analyze human errors contributing to Naval Aviation mis-
 haps. It incorporates features of Heinrich's "Domino The-
 ory" (Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos, 1980) and Edward's
 "SHEL Model" (Hawkins, 1993) as well as Reason's
 model to fully depict factors that are precursors to acci-
 dents. Latent conditions and active failures are parti-
 tioned into one of three categories (see Figure 2). These
 categories enable an analyst to identify failures at three
 levels historically related to accidents: supervisory condi-
 tion, operator condition, and operator act. These classifi-
 cations can then be used to target appropriate
 intervention strategies.
 Figure 2. HFACS Component Levels
 The original HFACS framework was adapted to classify
 human errors and other factors that contribute to MRMs.
 The HFACS addition, termed "Maintenance Extension"
 (ME), consists of four error categories: Supervisory Con-
 ditions (latent), Maintainer Conditions (latent), Working
 Conditions (latent), and Maintainer Acts (active).
 Following the HFACS-ME, Supervisory, Maintainer, and
 Working Conditions are latent factors that can impact a
 maintainer's performance and can contribute to an active
 failure, an Unsafe Maintainer Act. An Unsafe Maintainer
 Act may lead directly to a mishap or injury. For example,
 a maintainer runs a forklift into the side of an aircraft and
 damages it. The Unsafe Maintainer Act could also
 become a latent Maintenance Condition, which the air-
 crew would have to deal with on take-off, in-flight, or on
 landing. For example, an improperly rigged landing gear
 that collapses on touchdown or an over-torqued hydrau-
 lics line that fails in flight causing a fire. It is important to
 note that Supervisory Conditions related to design for
 maintainability, prescribed maintenance procedures, and
 standard maintenance operations could be inadequate
 and lead directly to a Maintenance Condition (see Figure
 3).
 Figure 3. HFACS Maintenance Extension Model
 The following paragraphs provide a brief illustration of the
 HFACS Maintenance Extension taxonomy levels.
 Latent Supervisory Conditions that can contribute to an
 active failure includes both unforeseen and squadron.
 Examples of unforeseen supervisory conditions include:
 • An engine that falls off of a stand during a change-
 out evolution due to an unforeseen hazard of a high
 seas state (Hazardous Operation)
 • A manual omits a step in a maintenance procedure,
 such as leaving out an o-ring that causes a fuel leak
 (Inadequate Documentation)
 • The poor layout of system components that do not
 permit direct observation of maintenance being per-
 formed (Inadequate Design)
 Examples of squadron supervisory conditions include:
 • A supervisor who does not ensure that maintenance
 personnel are wearing required personal protective
 gear (Inadequate Supervision)
 • A supervisor who directs a maintainer to perform a
 task without considering risks, such as driving a truck
 through a hangar (Inappropriate Operations)
 • A supervisor who neglects to correct maintainers
 who routinely bend the rules when they perform a
 common task (Uncorrected Problem)
 • A supervisor who willfully orders a maintainer to
 wash an aircraft without proper safety gear (Supervi-
 sory Violation)
 Latent Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to an
 active failure include medical, crew coordination, and
 readiness. Examples of maintainer medical conditions
 include:
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 • A maintainer who has a marital problem and cannot
 focus on a maintenance action (Mental State)
 • A maintainer who worked for 20 hours straight and
 suffers from fatigue (Physical State)
 • A maintainer who is short can not visually inspect air-
 craft before it is launched (Physical Limitation).
 Examples of maintainer crew coordination conditions
 include:
 • A maintainer who leads a taxiing aircraft into another
 due to improper hand signals (Communication)
 • A maintainer who performs a task, not in accordance
 with standard procedures, because the maintainer
 was overly submissive to a superior (Assertiveness)
 • A maintainer who downplays a downing discrepancy
 to meet the flight schedule (Adaptability)
 Examples of maintainer readiness conditions include:
 • A maintainer who is working on an aircraft skipped
 the requisite OJT evolution (Training)
 • A maintainer who engages in a procedure that they
 have not been qualified to perform (Certification)
 • A maintainer who is intoxicated on the job (Violation)
 Latent Working Conditions that can contribute to an
 active failure include environmental, equipment, and
 workspace. Examples of environmental working condi-
 tions include:
 • A maintainer who is working at night on the flightline
 does not see a tool he left behind (Lighting/Light)
 • A maintainer who is securing an aircraft in a driving
 rain fails to properly attach the chains (Weather)
 • A maintainer who is working on a pitching deck falls
 from the aircraft (Environmental Hazard)
 Examples of equipment working conditions include:
 • A maintainer who is using a defective test set does
 not precheck it before troubleshooting (Damaged)
 • A maintainer who starts working on landing gear
 without a jack because all in use (Unavailable)
 • A maintainer who uses an old manual because a CD-
 ROM reader is not available (Dated)
 Examples of workspace working conditions include:
 • A maintainer who is working in a hangar bay cannot
 properly position the maintenance stand (Confining)
 • A maintainer who is spotting an aircraft with his view
 obscured by catapult steam (Obstructed)
 • A maintainer who is unable to perform a corrosion
 inspection that is beyond his reach (Inaccessible)
 Maintainer Acts are active failures, which directly or indi-
 rectly cause mishaps, or lead to Latent Maintenance
 Condition, they include errors and violations.
 Examples of errors in maintainer acts include:
 • A maintainer who misses a hand signal and backs a
 forklift into an aircraft (Attention)
 • A maintainer who is very familiar with a procedure
 may reverse steps in a sequence (Memory)
 • A maintainer who inflates an aircraft tire to a pres-
 sure required by a different aircraft (Rule)
 • A maintainer who roughly handles a delicate engine
 valve causing damage (Skill)
 Examples of violations in maintainer acts include:
 • A maintainer who engages in practices, condoned by
 management, that bend the rules (Routine)
 • A maintainer who strays from accepted procedures
 to save time, bending a rule (Infraction)
 • A maintainer who willfully breaks standing rules dis-
 regarding the consequences (Exceptional)
 The three maintenance error levels reflect a shift from a
 molar to a micro perspective (see Table 1).
 Table 1. HFACS-ME Categories
 First Order Second Order Third Order
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 HFACS ANALYSIS OF CLASS A FY 90-97 MRMS
 Schmidt, Schmorrow, and Hardee(1998) conducted an
 analysis of 63 major Class A maintenance related mis-
 haps that occurred during FY 90-97. Four Navy mainte-
 nance personnel used the HFACS-ME to classify the
 human errors present. They uncovered an error profile for
 the major MRMs and showed that latent Supervisory,
 Maintainer, and Workspace Conditions can impact main-
 tainer job performance. Specifically, inadequate supervi-
 sion of maintenance evolutions, not ensuring personnel
 are trained and/or qualified, not enforcing rules, and poor
 communication characterize most latent Supervisory
 Conditions. Poor passdown, coordination, and communi-
 cation; non-use or lack of publications, policies, and pro-
 cedures; and fatigue comprise most latent Maintainer
 Conditions.
 Due to the focus and depth of maintenance mishap
 reports often Maintainer and Working Conditions were
 not cited or ignored altogether. Finally, most Maintainer
 Errors reflect a lack of training, experience, and skill,
 whereas Maintainer Violations consist of routine non-
 compliance with standard procedures and practices,
 infractions, and bending the rules in order to meet mis-
 sion requirements and the flight schedule. The HFACS-
 ME taxonomy was effective in capturing the nature of and
 relationships among latent conditions and active failures
 present in Class A MRMs. The insights gained provide a
 solid perspective for the development of potential inter-
 vention strategies.
 BACKGROUND
 The Naval Reserve Fleet Logistics Support (VR) Wing is
 a critical component of the worldwide pipeline that resup-
 plies and transports Naval forces. The VR Wing has a
 fleet of 53 aircraft composed of C-9B Skytrains, C-130J
 Hercules, and C-20D/G Gulfstreams. Whether moving
 Navy and Marine Corps personnel or supplies, the VR
 Wing flies over 62,000 hours annually throughout the
 world. With the potential disastrous outcome of a flight
 mishap, the detrimental impact of ground damage on
 mission readiness, or the tragedy of a serious personnel
 injury, the VR Wing Commander requested that the
 HFACS-ME be applied to all VR Community maintenance
 related incidents (MRIs), regardless of their severity.
 OBJECTIVE
 Naval Aviation has a strong interest in applying error
 models to aviation incidents to facilitate the identification
 of human factors problems and provide a basis for tai-
 lored intervention strategy development. Given the VR
 Wing Commander's desire to uncover errors present that
 contribute to mishaps and to proactively use the results
 to prioritize and focus safety efforts, a post hoc analysis
 of all VR maintenance related mishaps, hazard, and
 injury (incidents) reports for the last decade were ana-
 lyzed using the HFACS-ME to characterize the nature
 and prevalence of errors present.
 METHODS
 DATABASE - The Naval Safety Center's Safety Informa-
 tion Management System was queried to obtain all VR
 Community aircraft maintenance related incidents (MRI)
 for FY 90-98. A total of 124 VR MRI reports were consid-
 ered in this analysis.
 JUDGES - Two Naval Officers, both well versed in the
 HFACS-ME taxonomy and experienced in maintenance
 operations reviewed the causal factors present in the VR
 MRI reports. The MRIs were then coded independently
 by the two judges and Cohen's kappa was calculated as
 a measure of agreement and reliability. A kappa of .79
 was obtained, indicating an "excellent" agreement level
 between the two raters.
 PROCEDURE - Each MRI report case was indepen-
 dently reviewed and the HFACS-ME codes for each case
 were entered into a spreadsheet for subsequent tabula-
 tion. Each causal factor was assigned only one HFACS-
 ME code, and codes were only assigned to issues clearly
 identified as having had contributed to the mishap.
 Codes, which were disputed, were discussed and
 resolved on the spot or after conferring with a third party.
 ANALYSIS - Each HFACS-ME category level was totaled
 and frequencies were entered into a chart for later
 inspection. MRI dates were used to calculate discrete
 time intervals to evaluate the distribution and model the
 arrival process. The model was then used to predict the
 potential impact of targeted interventions.
 RESULTS
 Of the 124 MRIs, 26 (21.0%) were mishap investigation
 reports, 75 (60.5%) hazard reports, and 23 (18.5%) per-
 sonnel injury reports. There was a total of 263 causal fac-
 tors, averaging 2.1 per incident. A number of MRIs were
 directly attributable to maintenance performed by rework
 facilities (33; 26.6%). The main HFACS-ME category for
 these MRIs was Supervisory Conditions (30; 90.9%). To
 focus on Wing personnel errors, MRIs attributed to
 rework were partitioned out of the follow-on analysis. The
 first level breakout for the remaining 91 MRIs had Main-
 tainer Acts as the most prevalent (53%), and Supervisory
 (19%), Maintainer(15%), and Working (13%) Conditions
 a distant second, third and fourth.
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 Figure 4. First Order Maintenance Error Categories
 The percentage involvement of each second level
 HFACS-ME factor for the 91 remaining MRIs considered
 was derived. The most frequent factors present were as
 follows:
 Supervisory Conditions - 11.3% of the MRIs reported
 Squadron Supervisory Conditions. The majority of issues
 involve inadequate procedure, supervision, and training.
 Maintainer Conditions - 8.2% of the MRIs reported Crew
 Coordination. Note: Maintainer Conditions are likely
 present, but under reported. Pass down of information
 within work groups and from the company to the employ-
 ees was listed.
 Working Conditions - 8.2% of the MRIs reported Envi-
 ronment. Note: Workspace Conditions are likely present,
 but under reported. Lighting and confined workspace
 were mentioned as factors.
 Maintainer Acts - 40.5% of the MRIs reported Maintainer
 Errors, whereas 12.3% had Violations. Most errors
 entailed omissions or incomplete procedures, whereas
 violations involved not following procedures.
 Forecasted MR I totals/reductions were derived for two
 targets of intervention: rework error and procedural viola-
 tions. The status quo incident rate over a projected 3-
 year period would be 13.32 incidents per year. By incor-
 porating an intervention for rework error that is 50%
 effective (i.e., tighter contract monitoring) there would be
 a rate of 12.43 and five fewer incidents over a 3-year
 period. Further, by implementing an intervention that is at
 least 50% effective for procedural violations (i.e., proce-
 dural violations) there would be a rate of 1 1 .45 and six
 fewer incidents over a 3-year period. It is important to
 note that most rework errors and procedural violations
 led to more major/serious MRIs.
 CONCLUSIONS
 The HFACS-ME was effective in capturing the nature of
 and relationships among latent conditions and active fail-
 ures present in major and minor VR Community MRIs.
 Common factors observed include errors attributed to
 third party maintenance, inadequate supervision, failed
 communications, skill-based errors, and procedural viola-
 tions. The insights gained yield a solid perspective for the
 suggestion of intervention strategies. Further, combining
 that perspective with modeling procedures provides for
 projection of the potential impact of intervention and a
 rationale for prioritization of intervention efforts and allo-
 cation of organization resources.
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